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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN RE:
NORMAN WADE,
Disciplinary Proceeding.

l

Civil No.

PETITIONER'S BRIEF FOR REHEARING

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a disciplinary proceeding against Norman Wade,
a licensed and practicing attorney for the State of Utah.

DECISION ON ORIGINAL HEARING
No original hearing was held on this case. However,
the court reached a decision that your petitioner, Mr.
Wade, had neglected to attend to the affairs of his clients
and that he failed to maintain complete records of clients'
funds, securities and properties which were entrusted
to him and did not account to the client therefor and
as a result suspended your petitioner from the practice
of law for a period of two years.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON HEARING
Your petitioner seeks to have the court review the
record in the above-entitled case and to reduce the
judgment which this court has levied against your
petitioner.
STATEMENT OF FACT
Complaints against your petitioner were brought to
the Bar Association by LeGrande Hubbard, Helen Gledhill, Ruth Shaver, William Harrison, Donna P. Wise,
Carl Burkholtz and Shirley E. Moore. Hearings were
held by the Bar Commission on the said complaints and
the Bar Commission made the findings of fact and conclusions of law and recommended to the Supreme Court
that your petitioner be suspended for a period of two
years.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT TO
SUSPEND YOUR PETITIONER FOR A PERIOD OF
TWO YEARS WAS UNTIMELY IN LIGHT OF COURT
SANCTIONED NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN YOUR
PETITIONER AND THE BAR ASSOCIATION AT
THE TIME THE DECISION OF SUSPENSION WAS
ENTERED.
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Prior to the 18th day of April, 1972 it was informally
suggested to your petitioner that it would be a good
idea for him to contact the Bar Association concerning
the proceedings against petitioner; that perhaps an
agreement could be reached between the Bar Association
and petitioner concerning the disciplinary action which
would be taken against petitioner as a result of these
complaints against him. It was further suggested to
your petitioner that he contact Bryce Roe concerning
this matter. In response to these suggestions your petitioner made an appointment with Bryce Roe to meet
with him at 8: 30 a.m. on the 18th day of April, 1972.
On that date and at that time your petitioner met with
Bryce Roe concerning the matter and discussions were
had between your petitioner and Mr. Roe concerning
what action should be taken. At that time Mr. Roe
asked your petitioner what he would be willing· to
stipulate to with the Bar Association to which your
petitioner replied he would stipulate to anything the
Bar Association desired; that he hoped that the stipulation would not be too harsh in regard to your petitioner,
but that your petitioner was willing to comply with any
requirement of the Bar Association and to stipulate to
the same. Whereupon Mr. Roe stated to your petitioner
that shortly the Bar Association would be meeting and
that he would take the matter up with the Bar Association, let them know your petitioner's position on the
matter and thereafter contact your petitioner concerning
the Bar Association's desires. Mr. Roe thereafter failed
to contact your petitioner at any time concerning the
said matter and the next thing that your petitioner
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heard concerning the matter now before the court was
through the Deseret News newspaper when on the
evening of May 15, 1972 your petitioner read in the
Deseret News that he had been suspended by the
Supreme Court from the practice of law in the State
of Utah for a period of two years. Thereafter on the
17th of May your petitioner received through the mail
a formal notice from the Supreme Court in the form of
a decision by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.
Your petitioner had taken no further action with the
Supreme Court because his understanding with Mr. Roe
that there would be further negotiations between the
Bar Association and your petitioner and that he would
have the opportunity to stipulate with the Bar Association concerning the disciplinary action to be taken
against him in this matter. For this reason petitioner
took no further steps with this court to protect his rights
and interests.
POINT II
THE JUDGMENT BY THIS COURT AGAINST THE
PETITIONER IN THIS MATTER IS UNUSUALLY
HARSH IN LIGHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES ON
THIS CASE AND THEREFORE THE FACTS OF THE
CASE SHOULD BE REVIEWED AND THE JUDG·
MENT RECONSIDERED BY THE COURT.
The facts of this case show that complaints against
your petitioner were brought by Helen Jensen Gledhill,
Ruth Shaver, William Harrison, Donna P. Wise, Carl
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Rurkholiz, Shirley E. Moore and LeGrande Hubbard.
The findings of fact of the Bar Commission affirmatively
show that Gledhill and Shaver are both satisfied with
your petitioner's work for them. Since that time the
Shaver matter has been completely concluded to Mrs.
Shaver's satisfaction and that your petitioner is still
representing Mrs. Gledhill on various legal matters.
The records further show that although your petitioner
took longer to complete the work of Mrs. Wise than
Mr. Wise desired, that he did satisfactorily complete
Mrs. Wise's work.
The records further show that your petitioner was paid
a fee of $25 for consultation regarding the purchase of
a water softener by Mr. Burkholtz and that your petitioner gave Mr. Burkholtz the satisfactory and requested
advice. Thereafter, and this is a quote from the findings
of fact by the Bar Commission "There is some doubt
in the evidence as to what happened next, but it seems
likely that no decision was made by Burkholtz as to
which route he would follow and therefore Mr. Wade
took no further action. Mr. Burkholtz was served with
Summons and Complaint and he delivered the same to
Mr. Wade. Since no decision was made by Burkholtz as
to what course of action to follow Wade did not respond
to the complaint. Subsequently Burkholtz was cited into
court on a supplemental order and he terminated the
relationship with Wade". The record further shows that
your petitioner refunded Mr. Burkholtz's money.
In regard to the Harrison complaint the record will
show that Mr. Harrison retained your petitioner to
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represent him in multiple misdemeanor charges; that
the record further shows that your petitioner entered
the pleas of not guilty and demanded that trial be had
by jury on each separate charge; that thereafter without
notice to your petitioner a trial was had before Justice
of the Peace Childs in the absence of both your petitioner
and Harrison. When it was brought to the attention of
your petitioner that a trial had· been held without notice
to your petitioner, your petitioner thereafter filed an
appeal in the case after whicli Harrison was dissatisfied
with your petitioner's services and relieved him of any
further responsibility in regard to the matter. In light
of the above, it can hardly be seen in this matter how
your petitioner could have been at fault since he was
not notified of any trial to be had in the matter. It would
seem, therefore, from the foregoing, that your
was at fault only in the matters of Hubbard and Moore.
In regard to the Moore matter, Mrs. Moore was under
the influence of drugs at the time she was involved in an
automobile accident. She was cited by the court for leav·
ing the scene of an automobile accident and was under
investigation for the illegal use of drugs. Your petitioner
was retained by Mrs. Moore to represent her on both of
these matters. Your petitioner represented her on these
matters and as a result of said representations the drug
charge was never brought against Mrs. Moore and Mr.
Wade entered a plea of guilty to the charge of leaving
the scene of an accident and was fined $100 with $25
of it suspended, leaving a net payable of $75, said $75
was to have been paid within three months. Thereafte1
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Mrs. Moore paid certain monies to your petitioner
through your petitioner's secretary, but the amount paid
was not paid within the three months required and the
payments made were not shown to be on the court fine,
therefore, due to inadequate record keeping your peti,...
tioner did not apply the monies received to the payment
of the said fine and especially since some of the payments made were several months after the fine was to
have been paid. Further, while this was happening, Mrs.
Moore brought to the attention of your petitioner that
she had several bad checks out and requested your
petitioner to represent her on these matters, at which
tjme your petitioner informed Mrs. Moore that he would
have to be paid his fee completely for the representation
in the traffic case before monies would be applied to
the payment of the checks. Thereafter monies were
received by your petitioner. When the final payment
was made to your petitioner on December 12, 1969 for
the fine was months after said time should have been
paid and due to improper bookkeeping on the part of
your petitioner said funds were not applied to the fine,
since it was way past the time the fine should have been
paid. Thereafter other payments were made to your
petitioner and Mrs. Moore was cited into court for lack
of payment of the fine. Thereafter Mrs. Moore complained to the Bar Association and after the complaint
to the Bar Association was made your petitioner paid
the fine in full and further paid off monies on the outstanding bad checks of Mrs. Moore and excused a debt
of Mrs. Moore to your petitioner in excess of $400.
Although Mrs. Moore was inconvenienced extremely by
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the bookkeeping error on the part of your petitioner in
regard to the fine, since that time your petitioner has
more than made up for the same to Mrs. Moore.
In regard to the Hubbard matter, your petitioner did
fail to file a suit for Mr. Hubbard within the statute of
limitations. However there are certain extenuating
circumstances ·in this regard, these being that during
part of the period of the statute of limitations Mr. Hubbard was living out of the state and failed to contact
your petitioner during that time; that prior to the running of the statute of limitations on the claim of Mr.
Hubbard in November of 1969 Mr. Hubbard obtained
the file from your petitioner and turned the matter over
to another attorney to handle the matter prior to the
running of the statute of limitations; that said other
attorney further failed to file said suit and protect Mr.
Hubbard's interest although Mr. Hubbard had notice
at the time that no suit had been filed on his behalf.
That since this time Mr. Hubbard's claim for injuries
which were sustained in an automobile accident have
been completely satisfied by your petitioner.
In light of the foregoing facts it would seem that this
suspension of your petitioner for a period of two years
is extremely harsh and unjustified. It is the recommenda·
tion of your petitioner that since he was at fault in
certain of the matters before the court that he be
suspended for an undetermined length of time, which
said suspension would be reviewed by the Bar Com·
mission at the end of six months, at which time your
petitioner would have an opportunity to demonstrate
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to the Bar Commission what he has been doing during
that time and the steps which he has taken to alleviate
the factors which caused the problems in the past; that
if at the end of six months the Bar Commission felt that
the situation had been alleviated, that your petitioner
be reinstated to practice law for a probationary period
and that he be allowed to practice law under the supervision and control of the Bar Commission for such time
as the Commission and the court deems just and proper
and that after a satisfactory period of probation your
petitioner then be allowed to continue in the practice of
law; that if the Bar Commission at the end of six months
does not find your petitioner has corrected the faults
that another period of suspension be levied and that a
review of petitioner's position be made again at six
months or other appropriate time. In light of the facts
of this matter this judgment would seem to be far more
just than that which was levied by this court.
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CONCLUSION
That although the petitioner herein has been at fault
in the handling of certain matters entrusted to his care,
that the period of suspension against him as levied by
this court is unduly harsh and that the court should
therefore review the facts and enter judgment in accordance with the recommendation of petitioner under
Argument II hereof.
Respectfully submitted
NORMAN WADE
Attorney at Law
Suite 14, Intrade Bldg., So.
1399 South 7th East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105

